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Abstract 
This article explores how occult and medical epistemologies intersected in late Victorian and 
Edwardian courtroom narratives in the Old Bailey, London's Central Court. Rather than 
delineating the preternatural, it argues that this meeting of the occult and medical science 
resulted in a blurring of the boundaries between external and internal influences, between 
notions of prisoner and patient, the psychical and the insane. Considering the role of the 
accused, victims, medical authorities, lawyers and jurors, it examines how this 
epistemological shift developed, and how it was presented, manipulated, or hindered. 
Through investigating this attempt by medical 'experts' to pathologise the occult, it offers 
fresh insights into how medical testimony interpreted and employed accounts of witchcraft, 
mesmerism, and hypnotism in courtroom narratives. It concludes by briefly drawing attention 
to the resonances between the operation of occult, legal and medical influences over the mind 
and body in the late nineteenth-century courtroom.  
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On the afternoon of 7th August 1862, Elizabeth Free, a servant in the household of Mr and 
Mrs Cole, entered the first floor back room of their home in Brunswick Place, City Road, 
London, and discovered their fifteen-month old child Charles lying on the floor with its throat 
cut. Mrs Cole had carried the child to the room just five minutes earlier. Charged with the 
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wilful murder of her child, Adelaide Cole’s case was brought before the Old Bailey court. 
Witnesses testified that Cole had been a caring mother but, suffering from consumption, she 
had feared she would not recover, and had become afraid she would ‘have to leave her 
children to strangers’. One witness, Emma Dorrington, added that Cole had ‘once said that 
the evil spirits were all about, and made motion with her hands’. These comments were 
reiterated by Dr John Rogers, a physician who had been attending to Cole for a month. In 
court he stated, ‘on the evening of the murder she told me she was full of evil spirits, and 
asked me to cure them; and on the Saturday following she told me she was haunted by evil 
spirits, and that she saw the spirits murder the child before her eyes, and the next moment she 
denied the child's death altogether, and insisted … that it was crying in the next room’. 
Rogers’ medical opinion was that this was a case of homicidal monomania. He declared that 
Cole was ‘in a very low state mentally’ and believed her to have been ‘decidedly insane at the 
time this act was perpetrated.’ Cole was found not guilty, being deemed insane.1 
Adelaide Cole’s tragic account encapsulates this article’s focus on the way ideas of 
occult influence intersected with medical science in late Victorian and Edwardian courtroom 
narratives. It argues that under the scrutiny of the developing field of mental science there 
were sustained attempts to shift the occult from an object reality to mere signifier and 
symptom of mental states. Relocating the preternatural from external to internal influence 
mounted a challenge to its ontological nature, transforming fear of occult influence by others 
into anxiety about one’s own loss of internal control. This attempted repositioning of occult 
beliefs helped to draw such ideas into a realm of diagnosis and treatment for mental doctors 
while serving to make them legally comprehensible as signs of insanity to lawyers. 
Importantly however, it also argues that while medical ‘experts’ could influence a jury’s 
decision they were not authoritative enough in this period to impose a hegemonic 
interpretation of occult phenomena in the courtroom. Nor, despite the suggested mutual 
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benefits for medical men and lawyers, was there an unproblematic alliance between the 
professions, for older legal definitions of insanity still continued to assert themselves over 
evolving medical ones. It will be shown that various actors within the courtroom process, 
from the accused and victims, to lawyers, medical experts, and jurors, all played a role in 
encouraging, manipulating or impeding the effectiveness of this epistemological shift. At a 
time when the boundaries of the occult blurred towards (pseudo)science and those of 
evolving mental science were still in the process of formulation, the Old Bailey bore witness 
to the medical destabilising but not comprehensive overthrow of occult epistemologies. 
Historiographical consideration of occult practices in a legal context have tended to 
focus on changing state relations and shifting legal and public attitudes towards such ideas.2 
Despite the rich body of interdisciplinary scholarship relating to the law and psychiatry, and 
developing work on medicine and hypnotism, there appears surprisingly little sustained 
attempt to explore the relationship between the Victorian occult, medical science and the 
law.3 Scholarly analysis of fin-de-siècle anxieties about occult threats to the will and the 
permeability of the self has largely remained located in studies of psychical research and late-
nineteenth-century gothic literature. When those concerns have extended to medical debates 
about mesmerism or telepathy they have tended to dwell on (pseudo)scientific theorisations.4 
Unlike previous studies then, this article advances an important appreciation of the ways 
medical discourses about occult influence had legal application and consequence for those 
who found themselves in court. In his persuasive study of telepathy, Luckhurst argued that 
mind reading and related psychical phenomena developed in a late-nineteenth-century 
cultural moment of ‘suspended theorisations’.5 By focussing on a legal rather than a scholarly 
context, this article will demonstrate that the law court was a site where occult and scientific 
theorisations could not remain suspended but were necessarily contested or asserted. As 
Burnett notes, the law court was a ‘site for the production of social facts’, a cultural locale 
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that ‘to a significant extent shaped both the theories and the practices of knowledge 
production central to the emergence of modern science.’6 Rather than a direct collision, it will 
be shown that the occult was transformed by medical observations and inferences that 
naturalised it, not unproblematically, into expressions of abnormal or defective psychological 
states. As such, this article offers a reading of how and how successfully medical experts 
were able to employ occult ideas as semiotic signals within courtroom narratives.7 The 
originality of this paper lies in exploring a medical meta-reading of the occult, not so much 
focussing on acts and beliefs as how their presence in courtroom testimony was used by 
medical authorities and others. In doing so it offers a fresh insight into how we might read the 
occult in legal cases and how such ideas were situated in a period of epistemological 
uncertainty for both mental science and the occult.  
The methodological reasons for focussing on an analysis of Old Bailey court records 
are twofold. Firstly, the Proceedings of the Old Bailey provide rich and often detailed sources 
for accessing medical attitudes towards the occult in criminal cases in late Victorian and 
Edwardian London. Although they consist of edited and sometimes truncated summaries of 
court testimony, they demonstrate how the court interpreted occult ideas as evidence of 
motive, psychological state, and mental health.8 Secondly, the court’s need to fit occult 
beliefs into legal strictures means that cases are largely devoid of the overt editorialising that 
often accompanied press reports on such cases. Although obviously not immune to the 
broader cultural biases of the period, unspoken predilections (of judges and jurors), or a priori 
assumptions that suited the agendas of doctors and lawyers, the Old Bailey will be considered 
as a space in which the legal framework served to filtered out much of the sensationalist 
rhetoric regarding occult ideas and practices in this period.9 This allows the historian to 
engage with a more composed approach to the preternatural, albeit one founded on an 
inherent privileging of legal and, to a degree, medical interpretations of the occult. 
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This study of influence and uncertainty in the late Victorian mind is divided into three 
parts. Firstly, it examines belief in occult influence as an instigator of criminal actions and the 
way this destabilised the boundaries between ‘criminal’ and ‘victim’. In doing so, it indicates 
how the accused were themselves sometimes aware of an epistemological shift in occult 
explanations and instrumental in employing it for their own defence. Secondly it considers 
how medical experts situated occult-inspired crimes as derived from mental defects, thereby 
rendering the occult into a signifier of psychological abnormality. This resulted in a blurring 
of boundaries between prisoner and patient and cast doubt on the accused’s legal culpability 
for their actions. Thirdly it considers the effectiveness of courtroom medical experts in 
advancing this internalisation of occult beliefs. This draws attention to the fractures within 
and limitations of scientific rhetoric in this context, and also notes the influence of other key 
courtroom actors in determining the impact and effectiveness of this rhetoric, especially 
jurors. It concludes with some broader reflections on the parallels between occult influence, 
medical discourse, and court procedure, suggesting that while acting as agents of 
disenchantment, both legal and medical authorities exerted influences akin to the very occult 
phenomena they sought to dispel. 
 
Blurring the Occult Criminal/Victim 
The late-nineteenth-century British legal system did not accommodate the supernatural as a 
reality. Since the 1736 Witchcraft Act, supported through alterations to the Vagrants Act in 
1824, claims to powers of witchcraft, fortune-telling and other forms of occult knowledge 
were deemed fraudulent.10 However, reference to remote occult influences continued to 
appear in court cases between 1860 and 1910, often as justification for crimes. This was 
especially the case when the supposed victim of occult control had resorted to violent 
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attempts to reassert their will against such influence. This, and an attendant blurring of the 
boundaries between occult victim and criminal, is evident in the trial of Charles Tilbrook in 
1862.  
On Sunday 13th April Tilbrook violently assaulted his grandmother, Mary King, in her 
home in Charles Street, Westminster. Believing that she influenced him ‘by devilish arts’, he 
had attacked her with a razor and a stick, inflicting such wounds to her face and head that she 
spent seven weeks in hospital. In court Tilbrook claimed, ‘I did not intend to take her life; I 
only intended to draw some of her blood. It is evident she is connected with the devil. There 
have been persons connected with the devil who have done things of witchcraft, though it is 
not believed in at this day.’ Directly addressing the issue of occult control, Tilbrook stated 
‘she should not have that power over me which she has done with her … arts …The reason I 
took upon me to revenge my own wrongs, was because I expected I should get very little 
redress from the law, because people consider themselves so much enlightened in these days 
that they do not believe in such a crime, but I do …’.11  
Tilbrook’s case nicely demonstrates how the mid-nineteenth-century occult was 
situated in a legal framework. The law’s rejection of the reality of supernatural powers meant 
the folkloric tradition of drawing blood to break a witch’s spell was translated in this case 
into a charge of ‘breaking the peace’ and ‘wounding with intent to murder’. The law did not 
punish occult beliefs per se but rather the way they manifested as criminal behaviours. In 
court, occult beliefs had to be orientated within the confines of legal statutes and precedents, 
their unusual nature fitted in to contested narratives that revolved around intentions, actions, 
and consequences. Tilbrook was a rarity in his willingness to state what he had tried to do, 
given that the law could no longer provide legal redress against bewitchment. In doing so, he 
provides us with an early example of the accused articulating a perceived epistemological 
shift in occult belief (and accompanying legal changes that ‘forced’ him to take matters into 
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his own hands) into his own defence. Unlike later cases below, Tilbrook’s actions were not 
given a psychological interpretation by medical experts. There was scope for doing so, for 
developing understandings of the complexity of madness in the early Victorian period had led 
to a belief in bewitching being interpreted as a sign of monomania, a fixation upon one 
particular delusion.12 However, in Tilbrook’s case the court seemed to work from an 
assumption that his actions had been the consequence of irrational ‘superstition’ rather than 
evidence of mental illness. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. 
In the last quarter of the century expressions of fear of external control gradually 
transitioned from Tilbrook’s ‘traditional’ accounts of bewitching to the psychical influence of 
mesmerism and then hypnotism.  Despite a shift in occult explanation from bewitchment to 
mesmerism, the case of William Burns strongly resonates with that of Tilbrook thirty years 
earlier. In February 1891 Burns was similarly charged with wounding with intent to murder, 
although in this case it was his wife Louisa in their home in Horseferry Road, Westminster. 
Burns’ wife testified that, unable to find work as a scaffolder since Christmas, her husband 
had become prone to sudden violence, believed he was being pursued, and ‘several times 
alluded to being under the influence of mesmerism’. Following an attempt to cut his 
daughter’s throat in early February he had been confined to the lunatic ward in Fulham 
workhouse for several weeks. While there, the medical officer of the workhouse thought he 
was ‘suffering from the effects of insanity’, and despite improved behaviour that resulted in 
his release, felt that ‘his condition was such that he would be subject to attacks of insanity at 
times.’ These concerns were justified, for when release Burns attacked his wife with a 
hammer and chisel, leaving her hospitalised for a month. When charged, he stated ‘I believe I 
have been mesmerised; in fact, I know I have … I was mesmerised yesterday with sixpence 
on the mantelpiece and bits of elastic and old rags’. As such, both the accused and his victim 
were willing to introduce the notion of his being under mesmeric control. There are hints that 
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they were employing mesmeric belief or delusion as an indicator of temporary madness, for 
Louisa stated that she was ‘very anxious to have him back’ from the lunatic ward and her 
testimony displays no obvious bitterness towards him, despite her horrific injuries. Philip 
Gilbert, the medical officer at Holloway Prison, also advanced the idea that Burns had 
suffered from a bout of temporary insanity. He and Burns actually entered into a supportive 
exchange in the courtroom, with Burns asking Gilbert ‘Have I not behaved myself, and done 
whatever I am told’, to which the medical officer replied ‘You have; I had no occasion to put 
a straightjacket on you.’ Despite this, the jury rejected the claim of temporary insanity. 
Finding him guilty but insane, Burns was detained.13  
Although occult expressions of external control evolved over the period of our study 
they remained underpinned by a persistent concern for the sovereignty of individual will and 
feared loss of volition over one’s mind and body. To appreciate the significance of these fears 
and the criminal actions they inspired one has to recognise the value placed on willpower in a 
late Victorian culture that ‘stressed the integrity of the individual and an emphasis on self-
control’.14 Given the Victorians’ assertive drives, be it over self, nature, or society, the 
emphasis on willpower took myriad forms. At the start of our period it was being promoted 
by Samuel Smiles as the driving force behind the self-made man, and by the end, amidst 
developing notions of the fragmented psyche and crowd psychology, willpower was being 
viewed as a defence against personal and social disintegration.15 
It was in this later nineteenth-century context that learned debates and sensationalised 
claims about hypnotism gained medical and public attention. Developing from its origins in 
the reinvigorated interest in mesmerism in the 1830s and 1840s, late nineteenth-century 
hypnotism attempted to make itself more palatable to contemporary scientific thought. 
Surgeon James Braid had tried to grant hypnotism a scientific distance from the supernatural 
stigma that still clung to mesmerism, shifting the explanation of the trance state from external 
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invisible fluids to a psychological state to which the subject consented.16 Yet, unable to 
completely extract itself from its occult resonances, hypnotism also became a cause for 
concern about crime, culpability and the loss of will at the fin de siècle. This was given a 
degree of respectability in the late 1880s as the British medical profession briefly flirted with 
but ultimately rejected the idea of using hypnotism in medical practice. Openly debated in the 
British Medical Journal, this respected publication was not above talking up the potential for 
hypnotic crimes.17 Its editor, Ernest Hart, claimed the hypnotised would become ‘blindly, 
actively obedient to your wildest orders or most bizarre suggestions’ and this fed concern that 
a person could be induced to commit a crime whilst in a hypnotic state or even via post-
hypnotic suggestion.18 Crimes committed by a hypnotised subject would effectively work 
around the law for they were committed unknowingly, without will or intention. In such 
circumstances, the subject was merely a tool of the true criminal, the hypnotiser.19 
The British Medical Journal was obviously not the means by which most people 
became aware of hypnotism, its potential dangers, or its legal ambiguities. These notions 
entered into popular consciousness through the sensationalist claims made by newspapers, 
pamphlets, short stories and novels in the 1880s and 1890s, perhaps the most popular of 
which was George De Maurier’s novel, Trilby.20 According to Luckhurst, the ‘Trilby-mania 
of 1894 familiarised a wider constituency into the possibilities of hypnosis’ and, indeed, it is 
only from the later 1890s that one sees hypnotism being appropriated into defendants’ 
explanations for criminal behaviours in the Old Bailey.21 As such, some of the accused in late 
cases appear to have been aware of a shift in the expression of occult influences, possibly 
garnered from these popular fictions or the press, and attempted to employ it in their defence. 
That said, claims for diminished culpability for crimes on the basis of occult control are 
sparse.  
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A case from February 1882 was something of an exception. A servant, Maggie 
Nattrass, was charged with arson and damage to property for repeatedly setting fire to items 
in 10 Essex Road, Islington, the household in which she was employed. The mistress of the 
household testified that Nattrass had on several occasions said ‘she could not tell how it was, 
everything she touched turned to fire, she thought she was bewitched—she said that to me 
three or four times.’22 On the way to the police station she had stated ‘I don't know what 
made me do it; I do not remember anything about it’. The police officer testified that 
Nattrass’s ‘manner seemed strange, and her eyes wandered’, while another witness testified 
that ‘the prisoner complained of her head … and her eyes looked queer.’23 Despite the 
potential for a psychological interpretation of Nattrass’ pyromania and her beliefs in 
bewitchment, the court made nothing of the issue of possible mental illness or bewitchment 
raised respectively by a friend of the prosecutrix and a witness for the prisoner. In this case 
no medical authority was even consulted. Becoming bogged down in legal wrangling over 
whether Nattrass’ crime should be considered a felony or a misdemeanour, the judge, Mr 
Justice Hawkins, eventually ‘directed a verdict of not guilty’. 
A later case from 1906 offers a rare match with the previous decade’s fictional vogue 
for the threat of hypnotic control. It also appears to be a rather opportunistic attempt to 
retrospectively apply a pseudoscientific idea of recent cultural interest as justification for 
previous crimes. Arthur Bennett, a 40 year old carman, pleaded guilty to wounding Thomas 
Smith about the head with an iron bar. While in this instance he claimed to have been driven 
to it by homelessness and desperation, Bennett had a list of crimes dating back to 1888. 
These, he ‘attributed … to hypnotism’. Unfortunately the Proceedings did not record details 
of this claim. While this may have been presented as justification for a lack of control over 
his previous actions, Dr James Scott of Brixton Prison, a medical witness who had observed 
Bennett, testified that the defendant was mentally fit and had known right from wrong at the 
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time of his attack on Smith. With his medical expertise dependent upon first-hand empirical 
observation, neither Scott nor the court could entertain Bennett’s claims about the influence 
of hypnotism. Scott’s medical testimony regarding Bennett’s recent mental lucidity deftly 
sidestepped the reference to hypnotism and appears to have influenced the jury. Unpersuaded 
by his reference to hypnotism, they found Bennett guilty and he was sentenced to seven years 
imprisonment.24  
These cases indicate the fact that the epistemological shift in occult explanations did 
not derive in a neat, linear manner from proclamations made by medical authorities in the 
courtroom. Tilbrook’s self-justification, Nattrass’ apparent incomprehension, and Bennett’s 
seeming opportunism suggest the accused, and in William Burns’ case, possibly even the 
victim, were willing to employ these ideas as part of their testimony. Introduced as narrative 
assertions, evasions, and quite possibly manipulations to signify mental instability, they too 
helped contribute to the production of an epistemic discourse on the nature of the occult. 
From the viewpoint of the accused (and the lawyers or medical experts who spoke on their 
behalf), occult beliefs in external control helped blur the divide between ‘victim’ and 
‘criminal’. They also serve as examples of the persistent yet evolving belief in the influence 
of remote powers, the threat of external agents, and risks to the inviolable self; ideas that, for 
some, remained so strong that they could (be claimed to) drive people to maim or murder.  
 
Pathologising the Occult 
Although ‘mad doctors’ had played a role in trials since the mid-eighteenth century, the 
Victorian courtroom witnessed the growing presence of medical experts and testimony.25 By 
the late 1840s medical experts were already testifying in 90% of insanity trials that involved 
assault.26 While lay witnesses could only testify to physiological signs of mental illness based 
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upon ‘common sense’ deductions, the court granted medical experts greater freedom to make 
inferences and authoritative speculations based upon their observations, experience and 
knowledge. Eigen argues that the authority of the emerging medical expert was founded on 
convincing the court and the jury that they could not rely on surface impressions of madness, 
nor simply use the crime as evidence of such, but that ‘there was something rather more to 
madness than acting like a madman’.27 Mental illness, like occult influence, was invisible, 
and in advancing their interpretations medical authorities attempted to insinuate their will and 
knowledge into the minds of the accused and juries alike. 
The favouring of a psychological interpretation of the occult in Old Bailey trials can 
be situated as part of a longer trend that reached back into the eighteenth century. Castle has 
argued that an urge towards the ‘internalisation of the spectral – the gradual reinterpretation 
of ghosts and apparitions as hallucinations, or projections of the mind’ dated back to 
Enlightenment scepticism and the formulation of ‘apparition theory’ in the early nineteenth 
century. Yet she also observes how this resulted in the ‘uncanny “spectralization” of human 
psychology’ itself.28 As such, a medical discourse that tried to resituate occult influence as 
pathological thought could not wholly free itself of haunting associations. This attempt to 
pathologise ghosts was subsequently extended to spiritualism, and Old Bailey cases in the 
half century after 1860 demonstrate an attempt to continue to expand this internalising to 
incorporate any occult-related paranoia.29 Courtroom medical interpretations that promoted 
such a view were facilitated by the noted transition in occult influence from the supernatural 
to the psychical for these ideas were already moving towards a field of epistemological 
understanding that was located in the mind. By pursuing this trend inwards mental scientists 
appropriated the language of external occult ‘powers’, ‘forces’ or ‘influences’ and 
transformed them into their internal, psychological variants. The terminology may have 
stayed the same, but their reference and location had been fundamentally altered. In doing so, 
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medical authorities could administer to what they perceived as the repositioned source of 
occult belief - misguided thought and mental fabrications. 
Although the Old Bailey was a site in which occult and medical ideas intersected they 
did not directly collide. This was largely due to the administrative structure of courtroom 
procedure. The courtroom was a performative, storytelling space, with a set format for the 
order in which narratives were delivered, starting with the victim, witnesses for the 
prosecution, witnesses for the defence, those who spoke for the character of the accused, and 
then, sometimes, a statement from the accused themselves.30 Whereas Old Bailey court cases 
had previously involved an imbalanced confrontation between the accused and a prosecutor, 
the passing of the 1836 Prisoner’s Counsel Act led to a more professional, adversarial 
courtroom culture. The plaintiff and defendant increasingly surrendered their agency to 
competing lawyers who spoke on their behalf, cross-examined witnesses and directly 
addressed the jury.31 While the occult beliefs of the accused were discussed, the supposed 
believer themselves had limited opportunity to explain their ideas. The court rendered them 
powerless while giving room to medical testimony that contested the existence of the occult 
from mental scientific perspectives.  
There was potential for this interaction between medical practitioners and lawyers to 
be mutually self-serving. Acting as courtroom experts enabled doctors of mental science to 
bolster their evolving yet still uncertain professional credibility in a period when 
professionalism was a way of erecting disciplinary boundaries and garnering authority.32 In 
turn, their medical testimony could also serve a purpose for lawyers. Notions of external 
occult possession or theft of will was a crime that the law could not legislate against; like 
witchcraft, the causal factor was remote and unprovable. To solve this problem the Old 
Bailey court seemed to condone medical testimony that challenged the ontological status and 
nature of the occult, repositioning it from an unknown external influence to an internal one 
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conceived as pathological defect or physiological disorder. In eradicating remote influence 
and relocating it in the mind of the accused a causal link was formed that could be recognised 
and processed by the law in terms of self-control and moral comprehension. In the process, 
trials were often transformed from cases of assault or murder to insanity.  
These shifts in the presentation or occult ideas would have obviously been favoured 
by advocates for the defence. Criminal law was based on ‘the legal subject as a rational being 
with cognitive capacity’, one whose intentions could be held responsible for criminal 
consequences. Through presenting occult notions of influence as symptomatic of mental 
illness, medical testimony had the potential power to destabilise the legal subject as a rational 
being, to blur their status as criminal and/also victim, and to throw into uncertainty their legal 
culpability.33 The medical internalisation of the occult also conveniently allowed the court to 
sidestep any metaphysical speculation. Prosecuting lawyers may well contest the strength of a 
particular medical interpretation or, more commonly in the cases below, the jury might reject 
it, but neither appeared to challenge the underlying psychological premise that was being 
advanced. What they questioned was not the transformation of occult beliefs into symptoms 
of insanity but the disputed nature of the insanity that those occult beliefs appeared to signify. 
The struggle to clarify legal definitions of insanity preceded this mid-late nineteenth-
century epistemological shift in medical representations of the occult. Prior to 1800 only a 
case of total insanity could lead to an acquittal. However, the 1830s and 1840s saw an 
increasing awareness of the complexity of insanity, with the identification of specific manias, 
monomanias, and notions of moral insanity.34 The 1843 M’Naghten Rules marked an attempt 
to fix a definition of criminal insanity and the operation of the insanity defence in 
jurisprudence. Attempting to legally accommodate changing understandings of madness, the 
M’Naghten Rules declared that the accused had to be acquitted of legal culpability if it could 
be demonstrated that they had not known the difference between right and wrong at the time 
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of the act. This originally required evidence of ‘a defect of reason’ or mental delusion, but 
later it came to include the emerging idea of moral insanity; one could be conscious of the act 
but so ‘carried away by perverse sentiments’ that the accused was rendered a victim of ‘a will 
out of control’.35 While references to the accused seeing devils and ghosts as evidence of 
mental instability can be found in early nineteenth-century cases and beyond, they could now 
be read as signifiers of the ‘perverse sentiments’ required by the law.36  
For example, shortly after strangling her husband on the night of 21st April 1855, 
Rebecca Turton told an acquaintance that she ‘saw fairies and dead people at the side of the 
road’ as they returned to the rooms in Richard Street, Bromley, where she had left the corpse. 
Although citing the supernatural as indicative of an unstable or even insane mind, Turton’s 
insanity does not appear to have been a consistent state of mind. Gilbert McMurdo, the 
surgeon at Newgate Prison, had considered her insane and had her moved to Bethlehem 
Hospital, but the hospital soon deemed her sane and returned her to Newgate. Finding no sign 
of insanity, McMurdo had felt ‘there was nothing to prevent her standing trial.’37 McMurdo’s 
medical testimony seemed to operate within the M’Naghten Rules for it suggested Turton 
may have been incapable of recognising her wrongdoing at the time of the murder, despite 
subsequently regaining her sanity. As with many such cases, the jury rejected the notion of 
temporary or inconsistent insanity. She was found not guilty on the grounds of insanity but 
detained.38  
Although the drive towards an internalising of occult beliefs located it in the 
developing field of psychiatry, medical authorities often drew attention to physiological and 
delusionary signifiers to underpin their explanation. This was evident in the case of Adelaide 
Cole with which this paper began. Prior to the murder of her child her physician, Dr Rogers, 
had described Cole as being ‘in very bad health physically’ and when he attended to her after 
the murder ‘she complained of pains in her head’. While Cole claimed evil spirits had 
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compelled her to kill her son, the more persuasive medical interpretation presented by Rogers 
was that this tragedy arose from internal, mental issues fostered by her poor health, and 
possibly a mind overstimulated by too much reading (it was stated that she had spent the 
morning before the murder reading the Bible).39 Alluding to a disciplinary authority that was 
still very much in formation in the 1860s, Rogers commented that what ‘is known in the 
profession as a homicidal monomania … is frequently produced by religious delusions’. Here 
he appeared to be building upon comments by two previous witnesses who stated that Cole 
‘was very fond of reading the Bible’ and that she believed ‘the wrath of God was upon her’. 
Drawing upon signifiers linked to bodily health, reading habits and imagination, Rogers was 
able to transform what the accused believed to be a loss of will to external occult influence 
into an internalised loss of control over her own mental faculties. As he stated, in his opinion 
Cole had been ‘incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong at the time of the act’.40 
This was a clear attempt by Rogers to ensure his medical interpretation conformed to the 
M’Naghten Rules, structuring his statements to what by the 1860s had become an established 
legal determination for an insanity plea.  
This was very much in line with neurological and physiological causes of supernatural 
beliefs set down by the prominent alienist, Henry Maudsley. He claimed that in the sound 
mind such ideas could be explained through ‘defects and errors of human observation and 
reasoning’ or the ‘prolific activity of the imagination’, while in the unsound mind they could 
be attributed to hallucinations, illusions, manias and delusions.41 Particularly relevant to 
Cole’s case was Maudsley’s assertion that ‘In the delirium of insanity it is not an uncommon 
thing for the sufferer to see and hear persons who are the mere phantom creations of his 
disordered brain; and when the delirium is of an acute character these … have such full 
possession of his senses, usurp his attention so entirely, that real persons and voices can make 
no impression upon him.’42 
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Medical experts often drew upon a range of indicators to suggest a diagnosis of 
insanity, usually referencing physiological abnormalities and family history, particularly 
suicides.43 Occasionally allusions to occult ideas were woven into this signalling of mental 
instability although they were not necessarily portrayed as direct influences on criminal 
actions. In a murder case from October 1904 the court heard that the accused, 23 year old 
Albert James Holmes, had ‘been reading a great deal of literature lately on hypnotism’ and 
some of this material had been handed to the police following his arrest. James Scott, the 
medical officer at Brixton Prison, had had Holmes under observation and they had discussed 
‘his reading various books on hypnotism and mesmerism’. The medical officer openly 
dismissed them in court, stating ‘I have seen them, they may be read by anybody—they are 
sold in London, and are very silly pamphlets’. He suggested that any influence they may have 
had on Holmes’ killing of his infant nephew was indirect, noting that for those inclined 
towards mental instability ‘very little would tilt some weak minds over to insanity’. 
Seemingly aware that such a claim amounted to little more than speculation,  Scott’s medical 
testimony promoted the significance of physiological explanations over occult reading 
matter, citing how a discharge from Holmes’ ear had coincided with his mother’s noting a 
change in his character, ‘one of the earliest symptoms of mental disturbance’. It was also 
suggested that his childhood paralysis was thought to be ‘associated with mental impairment’ 
while a family history of suicide suggested a genetic predisposition towards mental 
instability.44  
Although incorporated as part of a multi-casual medical explanation of insanity, the 
occult dimension remained a notable signifier of delusion for the preternatural status of such 
ideas could serve as a pointed suggestion that mental processes had slipped beyond the 
bounds of ‘normality’. A case from August 1910 offers a useful illustration. George Gordano 
Hackshaw, a 33 year old decorator, was charged with the manslaughter of his younger 
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brother, William, following their fight in Plashett Road, East Ham. When Hackshaw 
surrendered himself to the police he stated, ‘I believe my brother hypnotises me. It has been 
going on for months, and I believe he had some influence over my wife as well.’ He had not 
intended to kill his brother and it was not an attempt to re-assert his will against hypnotic 
control. Sydney Dyer, the medical officer of Brixton Prison who had had Hackshaw under 
observation since the killing, reported that in discussion he had said, ‘of late he has had a lot 
of trouble with his head; that his dreams have been so terrifying that he is kept awake all 
night; that this has been going on for some five months, and that it is entirely due to hypnotic 
influences exercised over him by his brother and others’. Building upon Hackshaw’s 
‘delusion as to hypnotism’ as an expression of insanity, Dyer informed the court that once in 
Brixton Prison his belief in remote influence and the permeability of minds had transformed. 
Hackshaw had told Dyer that he could ‘by some magnetic power diagnose by his own 
feelings the different ailments of the other prisoners in the ward, as he feels exactly the same 
pains as they have.’ Addressing the issue of legal culpability, Dyer stated that at the time of 
the fight Hackshaw ‘knew the nature of the act, but he did not know it was wrong, as his 
mind was so absolutely warped by these delusions that his judgment was entirely in 
abeyance. It was acting on those delusions that he committed the offence.’ In this case at 
least, Dyer’s pathological reading of Hackshaw’s belief in hypnotic and magnetic influences 
seems to have convincing the Judge who then influenced the jury, for Mr. Justice Hamilton 
directed them ‘to find a verdict of guilty, but insane’.45  
As such, medical testimony tended to reposition occult beliefs so as to imply 
something other than itself. In doing so they became a mere signifier within a narrative of 
mental instability, one that frequently sought to transform the accused into a victim, not of 
external occult control but of their own internal mental delusions. In this context, occult 
elements served to create uncertainty around legal culpability and had a potentially 
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transformative effect on the status of the accused in the eyes of the jury. Appropriated into 
and serving the epistemological understandings of medical experts, the occult could still have 
a remote influence over the minds of others. 
 
The Influence of Medical Epistemologies 
In reflecting on how occult ideas were reformulated as indicators of insanity we have to 
appreciate that the influence of medical interpretations were not necessarily as robust or 
authoritative as the previous section may suggest. As has already been indicated in several 
cases, the Old Bailey was a forum involving a range of actors with varying degrees of 
influence, each having the potential to inform the production, manipulation and acceptance 
(or not) of a pathologised understanding of occult ideas. The effectiveness of this discourse 
was determined, in part, by issues internal to Victorian mental science, a discipline that was 
still in the process of evolving as a field of knowledge and as a profession in this period. Yet 
it was also influenced by the nature of the medical ‘experts’ who appeared in court, ongoing 
tensions between medical and legal definitions of insanity, and the biases of the jurors they 
attempted to persuade.  
Late Victorian mental science was far from a coherent body of epistemic authority 
against which occult epistemologies might be broken. There were a number of issues that 
bedevilled the emerging field and the courtroom medical ‘experts’ who spoke for it. The 
science of the mind encompassed physiological, neurological and psychological dimensions 
and this hybridity made it unclear whether it was presenting itself as ‘an objective or 
subjective science.’46 The problem for such an approach, at least from the perspective of 
building professional boundaries, was that the more mental medicine focussed on physiology 
(for example) the more it seemed to be encroaching upon a pre-existing field. Unlike medical 
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knowledge of anatomy, but like the occult it attempted to naturalise and psychologise, mental 
science had no tangible existence that an empirically-minded medical community could test.  
Linked to this, there was a clamour of conflicting interpretations regarding the mind, mental 
illness, apparitions, and the susceptibility to hypnotic suggestion.  
This was best represented by divisions between French schools of psychiatry and, 
alloyed to this, the debate over the therapeutic uses and risks of hypnotism within the Britain 
medical profession. French mental medicine was at the forefront of nineteenth-century 
studies of hypnotism but was split over the question of which type of patients were more 
susceptible to hypnotism. While Jean-Martin Charcot suggested his neurotic and hysterical 
(and therefore weak-willed or abnormal) patients at Salpetriere, Paris, made the best subjects, 
the calm, therapeutic approaches of Hippolyte Bernheim at Nancy suggested a more universal 
susceptibility to hypnotic influence.47 Closer to home, there were also conflicting views over 
how far one’s character could be overpowered by mesmerism. Despite sensationalist fears 
about a complete loss of self –control (and therefore a negation of legal culpability) under 
occult influence, James Coates’s 1904 Human Magnetism or How to Hypnotise claimed 
mesmerists could not do anything contrary to the moral will of the subject. Acts performed 
under mesmeric influence, even criminal ones, had to accord with their natural disposition.48 
As such, we can see a medical scientific episteme being advanced in occult-related court 
cases but it is harder to say exactly whose collective view, if any, it represented. If mental 
science’s epistemological claims about insights into occult ideas were as much rhetorical as 
empirical then the conflicting voices of the emerging psychiatric profession weakened the 
authority of any particular interpretation.          
These were further destabilised by a blurring of the demarcation between science and 
the occult across this period. Spiritualism drew upon pseudo-scientific terminology and 
empirical approaches ‘in order to authenticate, verify, and categorize the supernatural’, while 
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members of the Society for Psychical Research emulated the conduct of mainstream science 
(from which many were drawn) as a way of distinguishing themselves as ‘more scientific’ 
than spiritualists.49 While science sought to enforce a distinction between the supernatural 
and the natural, typically with an eye to either debunking or appropriating supposed aspects 
of the former into the latter, the modern occult risked the ‘collapse of the poles of this 
defining dichotomy by insisting that the supernatural [was] natural.’50 Grimes has illustrated 
how mental scientists’ repeatedly used the terms mesmerism and hypnotism interchangeably 
in manuals of the 1890s. As such, while hypnotism leaned towards a more scientific basis it 
could not fully escape mesmerism’s ‘supernatural and sinister implications’, thereby leaving 
‘the mind at the fin de siècle … a supremely haunted site.’51 Such developments served to 
compromise the boundaries of science while garnering the possibility of respect for 
previously discredited preternatural ideas. 
The potential persuasiveness and authority of psychological interpretations becomes 
even less secure when we take a closer examination of medical ‘experts’ in occult-related 
cases. Many Old Bailey cases suggest medical witnesses were not required to be noted 
‘experts’ in a particular field. They were commonly hospital or prison medical officers or 
surgeons, and their credibility as medical experts often appeared to rely on little more than 
the status of their position within a medical or penal institution.52 In most cases they had 
spent time observing the prisoner while in confinement, but in at least one case the 
observation was very brief.53 This emphasis on prisoner observation was an attempt to 
fashion themselves as empirical scientists. Under observation, they could test for ruses, the 
sustainability of delusions, and the nature of an individual’s madness, be it a particular 
monomaniac fixation or a broader derangement. Somewhat surprisingly then, several medical 
‘experts’ made open reference to not having personal experience in the suggested mental 
illness, particularly homicidal mania. Instead, they fell back on their reading. Dr Rogers, 
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Adelaide Cole’s physician, could not conclusively say whether she had suffered from 
monomania or homicidal mania. He admitted that he had ‘not given particular attention to 
diseases of the brain’, and that ‘I do not speak from experience but from books – the cases 
alluded to in the books are, I believe, recent, but I cannot swear it.’ This did little to bolster 
his authority as an expert. He compensated by emphasising that his opinion that she had not 
been in a sound mental state at the time of the crime was based on ‘the result of my 
observations.’54 From the court’s perspective his ‘expertise’ lay not with any detailed 
specialist knowledge of mental illness but with his familiarity with Adelaide Cole’s mental 
and physical condition.   
Although judges and lawyers had condoned the increasing presence of medical 
experts in court, there were ongoing tensions over who was best placed to make judgements 
on criminal responsibility and exculpatory insanity pleas. As Newton Ainsley puts it, ‘the 
medical and legal professions wrestled one another for authority over the insanity acquittal’.55 
These tensions did not simply arise from medical testimony being challenged in court, 
although ‘cross-examined by prosecutors, criticised by judges and rebuffed by juries’, some 
medical witnesses sought legal changes that would recognise their authority.56 Underlying 
this was the unresolved perpetuation of differing medical and legal definitions of insanity. 
Although shaping their testimony to the wording of the M’Naghten Rules, doctors of mental 
science were frustrated by their narrow legal conceptualisation of madness. In particular, the 
physicalist reference to evidence of ‘a disease of the mind’ was viewed as ‘a strategic move, 
designed to discount clinical concepts such as “moral insanity”, “lesions of the will” and 
“monomania”’. These failings prompted some medical writers to call for ‘the determination 
of insanity to be transferred from the jury to some form of specialist tribunal, presided over 
by experts on mental aberration’.57 For their part, judges and lawyers were determined to 
ensure that decisions regarding insanity and criminal responsibility should reside with juries, 
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not a medical elite. In the cases cited here, it is not lawyers who hindered a pathologised 
repositioning of the occult as a signifier of mental derangement (although one has to 
acknowledge that the Old Bailey transcripts do not always give a full account of cross-
examinations). Rather the rejection of certain medical presentations of insanity came from the 
jury, that decisive element within the courtroom that was least versed in medical or legal 
understanding, and perhaps most representative of the wider public’s views on occult 
influence and insanity.58 Juries appear to have been particularly resistant when medical 
authorities tried to advance claims for the temporary insanity of the accused.      
The power of medical testimony to only partially influence juries was seen in the case 
of Dr Charles Grimes. In the early hours of 25th April 1876 the occupants of 57 Euston 
Square had been woken by Grimes, a surgeon, pulling up the carpet, moving furniture and 
shouting as if he were ‘quite a maniac’ in his second floor room. The police had to force 
entry into his room and, armed with a gun, he wounded two officers in the ensuing struggle, 
one seriously. In custody Grimes told the police that somebody on the floor below ‘was 
mesmerising him’. He later said the mesmerist ‘was trying to throw him out [of] the window 
by force … and that there were wires from the room below to his room’ that aided the 
mesmerist’s influence over him.  
What makes this case notable is the unanimous judgement of three medical witnesses, 
namely that Grimes had suffered a temporary bout of insanity. The doctors all emphasised 
their experience or position to help establish their authority and to exert influence over the 
court. Dr Richard Parramore stated ‘I have seen several cases of delusion, and to the best of 
my judgment he was suffering under delusion at that time’ and ‘was evidently insane’. 
Grimes had not slept for several nights before the incident and had taken a large dose of 
opium as a sedative. This, Parramore claimed, ‘might cause delirium’ and could have fed 
Grimes’ paranoia that ‘somebody below was making him an experiment for mesmerism’. 
24 
 
 
John Rowland Gibson reported that he had been ‘medical officer at Newgate Prison for 
nearly twenty-one years’ and had seen ‘a great many cases involving insanity’. It was he who 
advanced the idea of temporary insanity, claiming ‘there is insanity which surrounds the 
commission of an act leaving the person sane afterwards; it may last for a short time and pass 
away’. He claimed Grimes had regained ‘perfect possession of his faculties’ and had come to 
recognise his beliefs about the mesmerist in the room below as a delusion. Finally, Joseph 
Hill had had Grimes under his charge at the lunatic ward of St Pancras workhouse since the 
incident. Hill stated ‘I have made insanity my study’ and ‘the strongest indication of insanity 
is delusion and [Grimes] was suffering from delusion’. Hill added that he agreed with the 
interpretations provided by Gibson and Parramore. If this unanimous medical verdict was an 
attempt to save a fellow medical practitioner it failed. The jury found Grimes ‘Not Guilty’ 
but, unconvinced that he had only suffered a temporary bout of insanity, had him detained.59 
Drawing upon the influence of their experience, observations and institutional 
positions, the three medical men successfully influenced the jury into accepted the 
repositioning of Grimes’ claims about mesmerism as mental delusion and signifier of a 
paranoid mentality, but failed to persuade them that such a defect could be merely temporary. 
The outcomes of both Grimes’ case and that of William Burns mentioned above suggest 
juries were willing to accept medical claims about insanity but tended to be unconvinced by 
complex and uncertain notions of temporary insanity. Once the idea of psychological 
pathology was introduced into proceedings the response tended to be to err on the side of 
caution and assume insanity’s influence continued to linger beneath apparent displays of 
restored mental coherence, regardless of the judgement of medical experts. What this seems 
to imply is that while medical witnesses wanted to claim professional insight into occult ideas 
and their connection to mental instability, the jury suspected that medical officers were 
themselves not above being deceived by individuals who were both cunning and insane. 
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Rather than passively absorbing a particular medical diagnosis they responded to certain parts 
but rejected others.  The law had long sought a clear definition of insanity and related issues 
of legal culpability. As medical experts attempted to increasingly complicate those issues, 
juries were (understandably, in the context of their role in court) inclined to favour 
established legal definitions of insanity over developing medical ones.60 
A final case illustrates the fact that these medical scientific epistemologies had not 
come to wholly dominate by the Edwardian period. Given that it marks an unusually direct 
confrontation between epistemological understandings it is worth exploring at some length. 
On 8th September 1908 Tom Wallis Rogers, a 40 year old ‘magnetic healer … medical 
hypnotist and mesmerist’, openly challenge medical authority in the Old Bailey courtroom. 
Rogers was accused of having obtained £14 and 15 shillings from Emma Elizabeth Ling, a 
parlour maid, through false pretences. Ling had had her right eye removed in 1899 and had 
since worn a glass one. Rogers had convinced Ling that he could use his magnetic powers to 
grow her a new eye. Ling stated in court that she had believed him. Rogers’ treatment had 
involved ‘tapping movements upon the spine’. After their first session Rogers told Ling ‘that 
the front layer of the eye was formed’ and that he was ‘satisfied that the eye would become a 
fact.’ However, after several months of treatment Ling went to the Middlesex Hospital where 
she was informed the supposed growth was merely the stump of her old eye. 
Dr Nathaniel Harman, an ophthalmic assistant at the Middlesex Hospital, was called 
as a medical expert. He openly stated the impossibility of being able to grow a new eye. 
However, Rogers, citing his fifteen years of study and experience in ‘applied psychology and 
the law of magnetism’, contested the legal charge, Harman’s judgement and, more broadly, 
medical orthodoxy. He declared that he had not taken money under false pretences because ‘I 
distinctly told the lady that I had never accomplished such a thing and that so far as I knew it 
had never been accomplished’, although he added, regardless of ‘the opinion of Dr. Harman, 
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or of the whole medical profession, or the fact that it has never been accomplished, there is 
no proof that it is impossible.’ Rogers suggested the growing of an eye was ‘nothing 
unnatural’ if one understands the law of nature and if ‘the practitioner has the power or force 
necessary to deal with those properties which go to make a natural eye.’ As far as he was 
concerned, ‘The opinion of the medical profession upon a matter wherein they have no 
education or experience, whereon they have not even thought, is worthless.’ As such, he was 
not trying to naturalise preternatural powers but viewed his magnetic abilities as inherently 
natural. 
Although willing to contest the limitations of contemporary medical knowledge, 
Rogers fared less well when the frame of reference was shifted from ophthalmic science to 
psychiatry. William Norwood East, deputy medical officer at Brixton Prison, had been 
observing Rogers since his admission. He found him to be of ‘unsound mind and incapable of 
knowing the nature and quality of his offence.’ Rogers had told Norwood East that he was 
‘capable of giving people new hearts, liver, and kidneys; that he can raise the dead; that he 
can break bones and heal them in five minutes by putting his finger on them; he says that by 
placing his finger on the bones they melt, then on his removing his finger they solidify and 
become like shell; … I believe all these are genuine insane delusions.’ Underlining the point 
for the jury, Judge Lumley Smith asked, ‘You mean that he pretends to medical powers 
which you consider impossible and improbable and that that shows he is mad?’ Norwood 
East replied, ‘Yes.’  
The revelation that Rogers had suffered from a nervous breakdown two years earlier 
aided the transition from unorthodox powers to mere mental delusion, from external 
influence to internal deception. Despite reasonable grounds for an insanity case, Rogers was 
found guilty and sentenced to nine months' imprisonment for deception. Indicative of the 
judge’s rather antiquated views on signifiers of insanity, Lumley Smith stated that Rogers had 
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not displayed ‘any sign of want of intellect’. Such an understanding bypassed the M’Naghten 
Rules and seemed to refer to legal definitions of insanity that harked back to the turn of the 
nineteenth century. Rogers was to ‘be kept under observation, and if he was found to be 
insane he would be treated accordingly.’61 Unlike previous cases, one senses Rogers may 
have been punished for his direct challenge to both the legal charge and the still malleable 
boundaries between orthodox and heterodox sciences at the turn of the twentieth century.  
Ultimately, the use of occult beliefs as a signifier of mental instability reveals the 
limitations of late-Victorian mental science. Delusion was not the initiating cause of mental 
illness but merely a symptom of such. As Henry Maudsley declared, it was ‘not in our power 
to explain psychologically the origin and nature’ of delusions, merely ‘to establish their 
existence as facts of observation, and to set forth the pathological conditions under which 
they are produced.’62 In court it was sufficient for medical expert to signify that ideas of 
bewitchment, spirit, mesmeric or hypnotic influence were indicative of delusion and not 
probe any deeper. As such, medical testimony sought to reduce the occult to a mere fictive 
element in a mental scientific narrative that alluded to but could not ultimately specify the 
nature of the mental defect. The workings and failings of the mind remained as unknown as 
the occult itself. 
 
Conclusion  
Rather than delineating the preternatural, the intersection of occult and mental scientific 
epistemologies in a legal context has emphasised blurring and transitioning, from notions of 
external to internal influence, with an accompanying destabilisation of boundaries between 
criminal and victim, prisoner and patient, the psychical and the insane. Yet in concluding, the 
larger, broader blurring appears to be that between enchantment and disenchantment. One is 
struck by the resonances between occult, legal and medical influences over the mind and 
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body of the individual in the late-nineteenth-century courtroom. Although ostensibly an 
agency of disenchantment, the operation of the law court reproduced many of the effects of 
occult influence in this period. Like witchcraft, the laws’ influence and controlling power was 
unseen but its effects were made manifest through words, rituals, and their real world 
consequences. As with witches’ curses, the law was ‘that version of the word which has 
immediate physical effects, of incarceration … of pain, of death.’63 Like the occult control of 
will believed to be exercised by mesmerists, ideas they sought to dispel or negate, medical 
and legal authorities required the accused/victim to surrender their will, personal agency, and, 
if detained, their bodily volition, to their interpretations and control.   
Under the influence of medical experts, the loss of control over one’s mind was not 
due to external occult realities but a submitting to their pathologised medical repositioning of 
such ideas as internal delusion. While the expression of occult ideas remained the same their 
epistemological reinterpretation fundamentally altered their nature, rendering them (and 
usually their accompanying paranoia) into a symptom of mental illness. In doing so the 
occult’s persistent challenge of incomprehensibility was, if not answered, at least relocated to 
a site that was comprehensible to both medical and legal authorities. Chettair has observed 
that the shift from supernatural to psychical beliefs marked a transition from educated 
commentators’ anxieties about lingering irrationality to their concern about the suggestibility 
of the masses.64 Yet it was through the suggestibility of psychological interpretations of the 
occult that this epistemological sleight of hand was asserted, albeit in a rather problematic 
fashion. As such, it is hoped that the broader relevance of this article will be to encourage 
scholars to consider more closely the occult nature of medical and legal discourses and 
institutions themselves. Medical and penal institutions have long been read as sites of 
controlling power discourses but that power has been understood as a resolutely secular one. 
In exploring legal and medical frameworks as mechanisms of disenchantment and 
29 
 
 
naturalisation, this article suggests we should take care not to overlook their own occult-like 
propensities and operations. 
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